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WILLIAM F. CARR, ESQ.*
PAUL P. OWEN, ESQ."

Clear As Crude: Defending Oil and
Gas Royalty Litigation
A new wave of litigation in New Mexico's state and federal courts
has been spawned by recent changes in the way oil and natural gas are
marketed and changes in the law governing the relationship between the
operators of producing properties and their royalty interest owners. This
paper examines the causes of this litigation, provides an overview of
relevant-New Mexico law as it relates to these disputes, and reviews some
practical strategies and obstacles to defending a case of this nature. While
the overview presented necessarily includes background discussion of the
origin and nature of current royalty disputes, for a comprehensive review
of the relevant case law on the subject, readers are referred to other papers
published concurrently with this writing.'
A royalty interest is a "share of production free of the costs of
production."' This is a sharing arrangement created by a lease contract
between the owner of oil and gas or other minerals (the lessor) and one who
is given the right to go onto the lands of the lessor and explore for and
develop these minerals (the lessee)? In return for allowing the lessor to
develop the minerals, the lessee is given a share of any minerals produced,
or a royalty. The share of the produced oil and gas is returned to the lessor
free of the costs of production, and the appellation "royalty" can be traced
to the share of mined gold or silver that was due the crown under English
common law.4
Unlike the English king, owners of hydrocarbon royalties generally
do not want and cannot practically take or use a share of the mineral
produced. Instead, they want a share of the proceeds received for the
* William F. Carr is a Santa Fe attorney practicing in Oil and Gas litigation, Administrative law and Legislation.
** Paul l Owen is a Santa Fe attorney practicing in Oil and Gas Law and Administrative
Law.

1. See, e.g. John S. Lowe, Current Issues in Royalty Clause Construction, 37 NAT.
REsouRcEsJ. No. 3 (1997); Owen L. Anderson, The Gas Royalty Obligation:Is Royalty Ordinarily
Payableon "R aw ' Gas at the Mouth of the Well or on Marketable Gas?, 37 NAT. RESOURCESJ. No.
3 (1997); Jacqueline Weaver, When Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Particularlyto Market
Gas, 37 NAT. RsOURCrSJ. No. 2(1997).
2. HOWARD R. WILUAMS& CHARLEJ. MEYERS, OiL AND GAS TERMS at 511 (4th ed. 1976).
3. HOWARD R. WI.LIAMS & CHARLESJ. MEYERS, OiL AND GAS LAW § 301, at 437 (Supp.

1986).
4. Robert E. Sullivan, All About Royalties, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 227, 228-32
(1971).
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product when it is sold. Although some royalties are paid in kind, most
royalty is in the form of a payment based on the value of the resource.
There is nothing new about disputes between producers and
royalty owners over how their royalties are calculated and paid. These
matters have been litigated since the turn of the century.' Likewise, the
issues presented by today's royalty calculation are not new and typically
fall into three general categories. They involve:
1) The basis for calculating the royalty payment or the
method of determining the value of the produced mineral
(i.e., should royalty be based on the proceeds of sale of the
resource, the value of the product, etc.);
2) The point of valuation of the product (i.e., where is the
value determined on the premises, at the well, etc.); and
3) The quality or condition of the product (i.e., in its raw state
at the mouth of the well or if not marketable at the well, after
placed in a marketable condition).
Each of these issues is currently being litigated in state or federal court in
New Mexico.
CAUSES OF CURRENT LITIGATION
Historically, producers sold natural gas at or near the well to a
pipeline purchaser under a long-term gas purchase agreement with stable
pricing provisions. However, changes occurred in the early 1980s regarding
the way oil and natural gas are produced and marketed as the result of
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders.6 With these
changes, the pipeline purchaser disappeared. The current regulatory
framework prohibits producers from selling their production to a purchaser
which itself owns, processes, transports, and resells that production.
The oil and gas industry responded to these changes with new
arrangements for the sale of production by forming affiliated marketing
companies and using other buy/sell and exchange arrangements. Instead
of basing royalty calculations on the actual value received for the specific
product attributable to the particular well and, correspondingly, to the
particular royalty owner, some producers calculate royalties based on a

5. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
6. See, for example, Order No. 436, Regulations of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles, 1982-85] & 30,665 (1985);
Order No. 436-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. [Regs. Preambles, 1982-85] & 30,675 (1986). For
comprehensive discussion, see Maria J.Williams, et aL, Determiningthe Lessor's Royalty Share
of Post-ProductionCosts: Is the Implied Covenant to Market the AppropriateAnalytical Framework?,
41 RocKY MTN. MIN. LAW INST., § 12.05[4], at 12-31 (1995).
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price tied to an index 7 With sales to affiliated companies, arms length
transactions became less frequent and questions were raised about the
proper method of valuing production for royalty calculations.
Recent case law has changed the method of calculating royalty.
Traditionally, producers have paid royalty based on the value of production
at the well or some other point of valuation set by the lease. Different leases
specified that royalties were to be based on the value of the production, or
the proceeds of sale. If production was not marketable at the well or other
point of valuation until the product had been dehydrated, compressed or
treated, the costs of these activities were subtracted from the downstream
sales price to mathematically compute a value upon which royalty
calculations would be based. These costs, incurred after the point of
valuation, increase the value of the production. Deducting the costs of these
value-enhancing measures from the sales price results in the sharing of
these costs between the lessor and the lessee.
Beginning in 1993, courts in several producing states have adopted
the "Marketable Condition Rule." 8 These courts take the position that the
implied covenant to market in oil and gas leases requires the lessee or
operator to put oil and gas in marketable condition at no expense to the
lessor or royalty interest owner.9
This rule has broad implications on existing contracts that govern
the rights of owners in oil and gas interests. The rule extends the definition
of "production" from the well where the product is in an unprocessed state
to the point where a marketable product is obtained that could be far
downstream from the well or other point of valuation set by the lease.
Accordingly, under the Marketable Condition Rule, additional costs are
imposed on the lessee or operator by prohibiting it from sharing the costs
of postproduction value adding activities with its lessor.
With the advent of new marketing arrangements and the
Marketable Condition Rule, the contractual relationships between
producers and royalty owners that were stable for many years have

7. See Craig R. Carber, NaturalGas PriceIndices: Do They Providea Sound Basis ForSales
and Royalty Payments? 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN.LAW INST. §.10.03, at 10-8 et seq. (1996). The term
"index price" refers to the arrangement by which the pricing of natural gas production is
tied to published indices. Id. at § 10.04lJ][aJ. The equivalent term for oil sales is "posted
price," which "is a publicly announced price at which a purchaser is willing to buy a certain
type and amount of petroleum products." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 616,621
n.4 (5th Cir. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); Garman v.
Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994); TXO Production Corp. v. State ex. reL
Commissioners of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994); and Wood v. TXO Production
Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
9. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 882-83.
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increasingly become the subject of litigation. Once crystalline duties and
financial arrangements have become clear as crude.
THE ROYALTY CASE-COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
Cases involving claims for improper calculation of royalty generally
involve large damage claims. They are either brought by the owners of large
royalty interests, by a voluntarily formed group of royalty owners, 0 or are
formed in the process of litigation."
Where operators make royalty payments to numerous individuals
pursuant to allegedly similar royalty clauses, class action certification is
often the first issue in a royalty suit and plaintiffs argue that the tests for
class certification is easily met. 2 The plaintiffs will seek to characterize the
lease forms used by the operator in acquiring interests in a geographic area
as identical or substantially similar, in an effort to satisfy the numerosity,
common questions (commonality), and typicality tests. 3 Furthermore, in an
effort to meet the commonality test, plaintiffs will seek to characterize the
operator's communications with its royalty owners as accomplished
through identical letters or through similar oral representations at the time
they executed their leases. 4 Plaintiffs also characterize as uniform the
methods used to calculate and pay royalty.'" In class action cases, the court
has broad discretion and the plaintiffs will work vigorously to convince the
court of superiority of a class action over numerous individual law suits. To
avoid class certification, the defendant operator must show that differences

10. See, for example, Complaint, paragraphs I and 5, Creson v. Amoco Production Co.
(No. CV 91-00042) (N.M. 10th Judicial Dist. 1996), in which the plaintiffs are trustees of the
Public Lands Royalty Trust which was created for the purpose of acquiring royalty interests
in State of New Mexico, Federal, and fee oil and gas leases.
11. See, for example, Stoute v. Wagner & Brown, 637 So.2d 1199 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 644 So.2d 638 (La. 1994) (royalty owners in single field in Louisiana sought class
certification in a royalty underpayment litigation case).
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (prerequisites to certification of a class are numerosity,
common questions of law or fact, typicality of class representatives' claims, and fairness and
accurateness of representative parties' representation of class). See also SCRA 1986, 1-023
(similar requirements for class action in New Mexico State District Court).
13. See Mobile Mineral Corp. v. Medford Mosley, No. CV-95-1564-FDM (Ala., Mobile
County, June 28,1996) (plaintiffs sought to characterize as insignificant myriad lease clauses
and other contractual arrangements, relying instead on argument that payment basis was
identical for all defendants).
14. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, Feerer v. Amoco Production Co., (Civ. No. 95-0012) (D.N.M. June 25,1996) at
5.
15. See Mobile Mineral, supranote 14 at 7.
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among the prospective class members will overwhelm the proceedings and
that individual questions will control and overshadow the litigation.1
Recently, plaintiffs have characterized the underlying leases and
other agreements as standard or identical forms, despite the diverse
circumstances in which each lease was developed and executed. In a class
certification context, this characterization can give substantial advantage to
some knowledgeable royalty owners. If the court finds that the class should
be certified in part because the underlying leases and other agreements are
substantially similar in form or substance, the court will, in interpreting
these agreements, apply an objective standard and consider the reasonable
expectation of the average member of the class. Following class certification,
sophisticated royalty owners with specialized knowledge of oil and gas
transactions will be treated like those who have no knowledge of these
transactions at all.' 8 Accordingly, class certification not only increases the
size of the suit, it also makes the defense much more difficult.
Where royalty owners are unable to obtain class certification, they
may file numerous identical suits in the same court. The benefit to the
plaintiffs of these "cookie cutter" suits is often to afford the plaintiffs most
of the benefits of class certification while forcing the defendants to defend
against diverse, frequently conflicting claims in the context of a series of
cases consolidated for discovery or trial purposes. The benefit to the
defendants is to avoid the potential of a massive judgment in a context in
which many of the plaintiffs in fact have diverse interests, and may not be
able to recover on the merits of their particular case.
The battle for class certification is often heated and potentially more
important than the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Consequently, pre-class
certification discovery can be as involved as that for the merits portion of
the case, and the strategic and practical decisions facing the practitioner are
not to be taken lightly. The most common approach is to partition the case
between class certification and merits issues and pursue discovery and legal
briefing of each separately.
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
Royalty suits are essentially large document contract cases.
Accordingly, the first part of the case analysis involves the identification of
16. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hardy, 628 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex. 1981) ("A class action...
involving three different fields, different units and various non-unitized leases is
unprecedented and virtually unmanageable.")
17. See Mobile Mineral, supra note 14 at 7.
18. Standard agreements ... are interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all
those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard
terms of the writing." Restatement (2d) Contracts § 211 (2) (1982).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

the documents that form the contract. In the typical suit, numerous
documents will be involved and the significance of the documents in the
context of the suit will depend on where they fit in the evidentiary
standards announced by the New Mexico Supreme Court in the recent line
of cases starting with CoR. Anthony Co. v. Lorretto Mall Partners." In C. R.
Anthony, the New Mexico Supreme Court defined the limits of the evidence
that a court may consider in determining if ambiguity exists in an existing
document which was fairly and impartially negotiated between the

parties. ° As a result of these cases, a review of the royalty obligations of the
lessee operator to its royalty owner steps outside the four comers of the
lease agreement and a wide variety of documents and other matters must
be identified and then analyzed.
Although much more than the lease is involved, the principal
document in a royalty case is the lease agreement. It is the basic contract of
the oil and gas industry and all rights between the lessor and the lessee flow
from this contract between them. Even though the primary consideration
to the lessor under a lease is royalty, little language on royalty appears in
most leases.' Leases take many different forms, but typically they address
certain standard matters. Most lease royalty provisions set the point of

19. 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238 (1991).
20. In C.R. Anthony, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that extrinsic evidence may
be considered in determining whether an ambiguity exists in the terms of a contract and that
courts may look at the circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine if the chosen
terms are clear. Under C.R. Anthony, the court may consider the contract language, the
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the purpose of the contract, the
relevant usage of the trade, the course of dealing between the parties, and the course of
performance. C.R. Anthony, 112 N.M. at 508-09, 817 P.2d at 242-43. Whether an ambiguity
exists is a question of law to be decided as a preliminary matter by the court. Mark V, Inc.
v. Melekas, 114 N.M. 778, 781, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (1993). Only after contract language is
determined to be ambiguous may the court look at extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
to aid in interpreting the terms of the agreement. Ruggles v. Ruggles, 114 N.M. 63, 860 P.2d
182 (1993). The court also has placed limits on the extrinsic evidence that may be considered
to assure that only matters that could form the basis of mutual assent are considered in
interpreting an agreement. Temporal constraints limit the review to evidence of the parties'
intent at the time the provisions were agreed to. Antecedent events may not be considered
except with course of performance and, although objective manifestations of intent may be
considered, if a party failed to communicate its understanding of the agreement, its
subjective intentions may not be considered.
21. Although the lease may say little about the calculation and payment of royalty, there
are a number of implied covenants which apply to all lessor lessee relationships. Reasons
advanced for implied covenants are that they cover matters that are so clearly within the
intent of the parties that there is no need to express them, that the nature of this
lessor/lessee relationship is such that it is impossible to address all contingencies in the
written contract, and that they protect the lessor since the lease agreement is typically
written by the lessee and offered to the lessor on a take it or leave it basis. Continental
Potash v. Freeport-McMoran, 115 N.M. 690, 694, 858 P.2d 66,80 (1993).
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valuation ("on the premises," "at the well" etc.)' and virtually all provide
for the method of determining the value of the production ("market value,"
"proceeds," etc.). However, few of these clauses address the marketing of
production. Certain lease royalty clauses have accepted and well
understood meanings in the oil and gas industry,2 but in royalty litigation
even the best term will be challenged as ambiguous. Nonetheless, if the
court determines that the meaning of these terms is clear, this clause can
conclusively establish the intent of the parties.
If the court determines that the royalty payment provisions in the
lease are ambiguous, numerous documents must be reviewed in the context
of the C. R. Anthony line of cases.
Some of these documents include:
1) Assignments. If a lease has been assigned, the assignment
must be examined to determine if the assignment creates
additional overriding royalty interests and if it specifies how
the royalty payments to these new interests are to be
calculated. The assignment may limit deductions upon
commitment to a communitization agreement if there is no
pooling clause in the original lease. The assignment may also
attempt to tie the payment of royalty on production from2the
leased interest to the price paid to other interest owners.
2) Unit Agreements. If the lease has been committed to a unit
plan, the unit agreement must be examined to determine if
the conformation clause has modified the royalty clause in the
underlying leases.'

22. If the lease is silent on the point of valuation, "at the well' is generally recognized
as the valuation point. Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the Deregulated
Natural Gas Industry, 42 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL LAW INST. 18-1, 18-24 (1996).
23. One royalty payment term with a widely accepted meaning in the oil and gas
industry is "net proceeds at the well." The method of valuation is established by the word
"proceeds." "At the well" sets the point of valuation and the use of the word "net' is
understood to mean that if the sale of the production is not at the well, deductions must be
made to the downstream sales price to mathematically reconstruct a wellhead value for the
product. See Martin v. Glass, 571 F.Supp. 1406, 1411-13 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affd w/o op., 736
F.2d 1424 (5th Cir. 1984).
24. In Creson v. Amoco Production Co., No. CV 91-00042 (N.M. 10th Judicial Dist. 1996),
certain assignments tied royalty payments to the royalty paid to the State of New Mexico or
the federal government, whichever was higher. See Defendants' Joint Trial Brief, Creson, at
4.
25. Note that the Bravo Dome Carbon Dioxide Unit Agreement (Article 6) provides for
payment of royalty on unitized substances on net proceeds at the well. See Defendants' Joint
Trial Brief, Creson, at 8. The Unit Agreement contains standard conformation clauses that
conform underlying leases to the terms of the unit agreement. Id. at 1.
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3) Division Orders. These contracts may pose special
problems and the law of the jurisdiction should be checked to
determine if the Division Order modifies or replaces the
terms of the lease or unit agreement concerning the duty to
account for and pay royalty.'
In addition to these documents, all communications between the
lessee and lessor should be evaluated in the context of the C. R. Anthony
standard. This includes all correspondence, all printed material, if any, and
all statements made in public meetings or to regulatory agencies and all
testimony presented in regulatory hearings that relate to the leased
interests. This review should also consider the time the lessor was allowed
to review the proposed lease or other documents, the knowledge of the
lessor (unless there has been a class certification), and the type of expert
advice, if any, the lessor received prior to the execution of the lease. If
course of performance of the parties is an issue, efforts to unitize may be
important as well as the efforts undertaken by the lessee operator to market
the production.
NEW MEXICO LAW
In addition to the C. R. Anthony standards, the documents and other
facts must be reviewed in the context of the substantive law of the
applicable jurisdiction. Although under review by cases currently in court,
New Mexico has not adopted the "Marketable Condition Rule."
Furthermore, no New Mexico case has imposed the requirement that the
lessee of state or fee lands bear all the costs of obtaining a marketable
product.
1. Federal Leases
The character of the land at issue will initially determine the
obligations of the operator. If a federal lease is involved, the lessee is
required to put the product in a marketable condition, for long ago the
federal government adopted its own version of the "Marketable Condition
Rule." The courts have upheld this requirement and held that leases of
federal lands are subject to ongoing statutory and regulatory standards
which include the Mineral Leasing Act, the Department of the Interior
Regulations, lease terms and the Secretary's interpretation thereof.'

26. There is no case law in New Mexico addressing the effect of a Division Order on the
underlying lease obligations.
27. California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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2. State Leases
The State of New Mexico utilizes a statutory lease form which
permits the deduction of post wellhead costs in calculating royalty.' In an
effort to clarify and expand the State's royalty claim, the Commissioner of
Public Lands adopted New Mexico State Land Office Rule 1.059 entitled
"Calculating and Remitting Oil and Gas Royalties" effective January 1,
1990. The stated purpose of this amendment to the State Land Office Rules
was to standardize the practice of calculating royalties under the State Oil
and Gas Lease and to combat widespread under-reporting of royalties by
lessees."9
The value of oil and gas for the calculation of state royalty is based
on the "proceeds" received from the sale of the production.' Rule 1.059
attempted to expand the meaning of "proceeds" to require lessees of state
minerals to bear the costs of obtaining marketable production with the
following new definition:
"Proceeds" means the total consideration accruing to the
lessee. It includes reimbursement for dehydration, compression, measurement, or field gathering to the extent that the
31
lessee is obligated to perform them at no cost to the lessee.
Although this definition may fail to clarify what was meant by the
term "proceeds," there can be no doubt that this was an attempt by the
Commissioner to adopt its own form of "Marketable Condition Rule" for
State of New Mexico leases.
New Mexico oil and gas producers challenged these new rules and
specifically the definition of the term proceeds in court.32 On October 16,
1996, the Tenth Circuit set aside this definition observing that while the
Commissioner may promulgate rules consistent with legislative enactments,
with the definition of "proceeds" in Rule 1.059 the Commissioner "creates
new categories of payments not already in State Leases . . .(such as)
reimbursement for dehydration, compression and measurement of field
gathering."' The court agreed with the producer defendants that New

28. NMSA 1978, §§ 19-10-1 et. seq. (Repl. Pamp. 1994). Not only does the state statutory
lease form allow deductions of post wellhead costs in computing royalty, in the past,
operators were able to meet with the Land Commissioners staff and negotiate how royalty
would be calculated and paid on an individual project
basis. The resulting method of calculating royalty did not even have to be consistent with
how state taxes were calculated.
29. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d1222, 1228(10th Cir. 1996).
30. See, for example, NMSA 1978, § 19-10-4.1(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
31. New Mexico Land Office Rule 1.059.
32. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d 1222.
33. Id. at 1239.
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Mexico State Land Office Rule 1.059 "attaches new and different obligations
upon lessees under the New Mexico statutory lease" and concluded that the
Commissioner usurped a legislative function.'
3. Case law
A minority of producing states have adopted the Marketable
Condition Rule. Texasl and Louisiana,3 however, have rejected the theory
that the Implied Duty to Market requires producers to bear all costs
associated with obtaining a marketable product.' Although there is limited
case law in New Mexico on this issue, New Mexico has historically followed
Texas law on issues relating to oil and gas matters.
The New Mexico courts have held that the duty of the lessee to its
lessor is that of a reasonably prudent operator, in cases such as Watson Truck
39 Furthermore,
& Supply v. Males;' ContinentalPotash v. Freeport-McMoran.
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between lessors and lessees has
been rejected in New Mexico.4'
New Mexico courts have not been silent on the effect of implied
covenants in mineral leases. In Continental Potash, the holders of certain
overriding royalty interests brought suit against mine operators to recover
lost royalty payments. On appeal of a trial decision for the overriding
royalty owners, the New Mexico Supreme Court took a sharp turn away
from the Marketable Condition Rule and reversed the lower court,
concluding that implied covenants in mineral leases do not apply to
overriding royalty owners for they are not entitled to the benefits of the

34. The term "at the well' was the source of legislative interest in July 1996 when the
New Mexico Interim Legislative Revenue Stabilization and Tax Policy Committee held a
hearing on whether a statutory definition was needed to assure proper calculation and
payment of taxes and royalties to the state.
35. In recent decisions the Texas Supreme Court has held that with a "net proceeds at
the well" royalty clause, royalty owners are required to bear their share of post production
costs. Judice v. Mewbourn, 939 S.W. 2d 133,137 (Tex. 1996). The court issued a similar ruling
when confronted with a "market value at the well" royalty clause. Heritage Resources v.
NationsBank, 939 S.W*2d 118, (Tex. 1996).
36. See Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154,157-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826

(1960).
37. For a comprehensive analysis of the differing treatments of the Marketable
Condition Rule, see Maria J. Williams, et al., Determining the Lessor's Royalty Share of PostProductionCosts: Is the Implied Covenant to Market the AppropriateAnalytical Framework?, 41
RocKY MTN. MiN. LAw INsr., §§ 12.06[1J to 12.0616], at 12-34 to 12-68 (1995); and see generally
Owen L. Anderson, The Gas Royalty Obligation:Is Royalty OrdinarilyPayableon the "Raw" Gas
at the Mouth of the Well or on "Marketable"Gas?, 37 NAT. REsouRcEs J. No. 3 (1997).
38. 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639,642 (1990).
39. 115 N.M. 690,858 P.2d 66(1993).
40. Id. at 701, 858 P.2d at 77.
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covenants in the base lease.41 The court noted that implied covenants are not
favored in the law, rest entirely on the presumed intentions of the parties
as expressed in the written contract, and for an implied covenant to be
found by the Court, it must appear that the covenant was so clearly within
the intent of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it.' The
Court also noted that an implied covenant cannot coexist with an express
covenant that specifically speaks to the same subject and that when a
contract between parties speaks to the obligation sought to be imposed,
courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. 3
Finally, the Continental Potash Court adopted the analysis of the
Texas Supreme Court in Kingsley v.Western NaturalGas Co.44 In Kingsley, the
Texas court held that implied covenants are disfavored, and must only be
found in the presumed intent of the parties from reading the subject
document as a whole, and must only be found if it is necessary to give full
effect to the contract."
Although no New Mexico cases address the Marketable Condition
Rule, Libby v. DeBaca" and Darr v.EldridgF address the implied duty to
market oil and gas. The DarrCourt noted that the implied duty to market
required lessees "to make diligent efforts to market the production in order
that the lessor may realize [benefits from the lease arrangement] on his
royalty interest."' It is noteworthy, however, that these cases addressed the
marketing of production or the seeking of a market, not who pays the cost
associated with making the product marketable.
New Mexico courts have not adopted the Marketable Condition
Rule or even addressed the allocation of costs between the lessor and lessee
for postproduction activities that are necessary to make the production
marketable. Under Continental Potash, the authority cited and adopted49
therein, and the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Harvey E. Yates Company,

41. Id. at 705, 858 P.2d at 81 (citing Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, OIL AND
GAS LAw (1992)).

42. Id.
at 704, b.58 P.2d at 80.
43. Id. (citing Kerr McGee Corp. v. Bokum Corp., 458 F.2d 1067,1078 (10th Cir. 1972)).
44. 393 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App. 1965).
45. ContinentalPotash v. Freeport-Morgan,115 N.M. at 704, 858 P.2d at 80 (1993) (citing
and quoting Kingsley, 393 $.W.2d at 350-51 (citation omitted)).
46. 51 N.M. 95,179 P.2d 263 (1947).
47. 66 N.M. 260,346 P.2d 1041 (1959).

48. Darr, 66 N.M. at 265,346 P.2d at 1044 (quoting Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425,432
(10th Cir. 1936)).
49. In Harvey E. Yates, the Tenth Circuit declined to impose implied covenants but
instead turned to the terms of the lease to determine if a lessee was obligated to bear the
costs of making production marketable. It stated, "[Wie have concluded that Commissioner's
alternative arguments of the duty to market... are unavailing in this case because the state's
rights here are governed by the terms of its leases with HEYCO." Id. at 1237, n 12.
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New Mexico will probably reject the "Marketable Condition Rule" whereby
a "net proceeds at the well" royalty clause will be construed to mean "gross
proceeds at the tailgate of a downstream processing plant."
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Marketable Condition Rule presents serious
problems for the lessee of oil and gas rights, for it alters the relationship,
between lessors and lessees by rewriting the lease contract to place new
burdens on the lessee. This is done with little or no regard for the
underlying lease language. Since the test of the Marketable Condition Rule
is met when oil and gas is sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer on the
open market, where this rule has been adopted, new marketing
arrangements will be developed to avoid the burdens it imposes on the
lessee. Production that now is gathered, dehydrated, compressed or
otherwise treated by the lessee will be sold at the well in its unprocessed
state to third parties who will then perform these downstream valueenhancing activities.
These new arrangements will inject a new step into the process of
producing and marketing oil and natural gas. The cost of conducting these
post-wellhead activities through third parties should be higher than the cost
of having the lessee perform these services. Therefore, the likely ultimate
result of the Marketable Condition Rule and the oil and gas industry's
response thereto, will not be higher royalty payments, but, instead, only
increased production costs.

